Napoleon 1809 – Campagne des Cinq Jours

By Douglas James Allan

Introduction

In January, 1809, history’s greatest general faced a near overwhelming series of crises.  From insurrection in Spain, to a budding coup attempt in Paris, then on to a massive Austrian army on the offensive, the tasks seemed endless and insurmountable.   Napoleon’s Campagne des Cinq Jours (Five Day Campaign) preceded the better-known battles of Aspern-Essling and Wagram, but have a complexity and finesse of exceptional interest. They were by no means inconsequential

It is necessary to recount the state of the campaign in Spain, and the amalgamation of forces prior to the arrival of Napoleon in Bavaria, near the Austrian frontier.  For France, 1809 would bring war fought on multiple fronts, with allied armies on all sides; above all, a war of attrition.

Napoleon himself is reported to have believed that the Ratisbon sector combats known as the Five Day Campaign – the primary focus here – comprised the masterpiece of his military career.[i]  That conclusion is of course, utterly at odds with the view of armchair historians, who are almost unanimous in pointing to Austerlitz as the pinnacle.  You will not be surprised to learn that this writer sides with le Tondu. The task at Austerlitz was far less complex, the Grande Armée in 1805 far more formidable.

France’s position in 1809 was that of a country nearly surrounded by enemies and would-be enemies. It should be remembered that many of those countries’ hostilities pre-dated Napoleon’s rise to power.  Revolutionary fervor had gripped the French population as it successfully fought wars of national defense, and then extended that fervor and martial prowess into offensive operations outside the borders of France.  Moreover, France was the most populous country in Europe at the time.  France was therefore viewed as a long-term military and economic threat to the stability of the other Great Powers, not to mention a political one, given the “liberty, equality and fraternity” mantra of its armies.

Part of the (usually unstated) problem was Paris’ success as Europe’s unofficial capital.  Success breeds envy.  The growth of the Republic-then-Empire was almost universally resented – the Poles the exception – not to mention Napoleon’s undoubted political expansionistic tendencies.  Imperial Rome in the distant past, and Victorian Britain in the decades to come, would share many of those characteristics.  It is the nature of Empire.

Unsurprisingly, Napoleon’s military successes had engendered multiple coalitions against him. The quandary from Napoleon’s perspective was: how to reconcile the unending need for military victories to maintain France’s and (most especially) his own position, with the need for long term peace and prosperity in Europe? He had no illusions that the Empire would survive without him.  That would require another decade or more to establish.

It was an unsolvable dilemma because none of the major powers would, at least in the long run, be satisfied with anything less than his overthrow.  Those leaders who vacillated after Tilsit – like Tsar Alexander and Frederick of Prussia – were incessantly lobbied not only by their own courts, but by major French personages.  Those included Talleyrand, Murat, Fouché, and Madame de Staël, not to mention he who later became Louis XVIII and his noble adherents.  Seen from the perspective of history, there was no conceivable way Napoleon could succeed, the “god of war’s” astonishing military talents notwithstanding. The adversaries were too many, and their resources too great.  Above all was Britain, her navy and her financiers.

Prelude in Spain

And so we begin on January 2^nd, 1809 with the Emperor Napoleon in the Valladolli region of Northwest Spain in the snow.  His army had just discovered 1,000 British women and children, shivering and starving in the cold.  Napoleon was in hot pursuit of General Sir John Moore with 22,500 troops[ii].  Moore was probably the ablest – though not the best politically connected – of the British generals, but his forces were entirely inadequate to stop the French advance.  Rather than abandon those dependents, Napoleon had personally taken time to see that they were returned to the British army, well fed, warm and protected.[iii]  The “Corsican ogre’s reputation was not quite reality; a lesser man might have held them as hostages.

During those same days, he was informed that the situation in greater Europe had reached a critical stage.  He would have to act, and quickly.

The quandary was the Spanish insurrection had become virtually unmanageable and required his continuing personal gifts.  Brother Joseph as installed monarch had proven incapable of maintaining order, and atrocities by both sides were out of control.  Napoleon had ordered 200,000 men to the armies in Spain, having left only 90,000 with Davout and the Army of the Rhine.  Austria was again beating the drums of war.  Heavy casualties had plagued the French in Spain, and Napoleon even had to go to considerable lengths to protect the 10,000 men of his Guard posted there.[iv]   He had already lost up to 75,000 troops in total, and he would be forced to leave some Guard units in Spain, as well as part of his cavalry, Soult, Ney, and several other of his marshals.[v]  This was no time to leave.

His position was complex, but not without strong points.  Napoleon had destroyed three Spanish field armies and forced Moore’s evacuation from Corunna.  Wellington had only 15-20,000 British troops (the accounts vary), and Joseph had been restored to the Spanish throne.  The emperor had no illusions though.  The entire country was aflame, far from pacified, and several corps would be required to maintain order.  Perhaps 60% of his available forces were either in Spain or Portugal.

Nevertheless, he had no choice but to head to Germany to prepare to engage resurgent Austria, but first and urgently, he must return to Paris.  On January 15^th, he had written to Prince Eugene, Jerome, Marmont, the Confederation sovereigns and the ambassadors:

   I am on my way back…My Guard and part of my army are retiring for the time being… If Austria persists in her folly, I shall invade her with 400,000 Frenchmen…The business in Spain is finished; the Spanish armies are destroyed, and the English thrown into the sea…[vi]

That letter is a masterpiece of how to combine truth, obfuscation, and beneath the braggadocio, a very sotto voce admission that all was not well.  Note the phrase “for the time being.”  He evidently expected that it would be necessary for him to return.   As for “400,000” Frenchmen, his recipients (and of course, adversaries) would be unable to ascertain just how large a part of his army was “retiring”.   In fact, the majority would have to remain as the French tried in vain to subdue the entire country.   He wouldn’t have 400,000 to attack Austria, and he would need to rely heavily on new conscripts and dubious allies.

Lastly, Sir John Moore’s army had indeed been forced to evacuate, but Wellington remained and would be well supplied by the British navy.  Marshal Soult and colleagues would remain to face the talents of Viscount Wellington and his Spanish and Portuguese allies.  Ominously, there was a vast motivational difference between the warring parties – the French were fighting to be able to return home; the Spanish and Portuguese for their homelands.  As for the British, they sagely always left open a route to reach their navy at their backs.  And the Emperor had to consider a possible British landing in the Netherlands or Flanders.

Not least of the crises facing the emperor was the political situation in Paris.  Ever devious and venal Talleyrand and mass murderer Fouché were perennially plotting, and now there was news that Murat and even the Emperor’s sister Caroline were among the plotters!  Napoleon sacked Talleyrand from his position as foreign minister as soon as he arrived in his capital, required daily reports from Fouché, and made it clear to all that a hint of an active plot would result in the most dire consequences.

As for Austria, that was a very different matter. One sometimes underappreciated talent of Napoleon was his ability to stay well informed by his intelligence service.  He was too well aware that Austria had been rearming for three years, and he suspected that hostilities would shortly follow.  He must act, pre-emptively if necessary; he was however, not yet aware that on February 8^th, the Austrian Imperial Government had firmly decided on war with France.  So on the 21^st, Napoleon sent most of the Imperial Guard (but excluding some cavalry and infantry units[vii]), back to France to be re-equipped and sent on to the Eastern front.  The last of the Guard would reach Paris on April 30^th.  France would lose more men in Spain than in the Russian debacle of 1812.[viii]

As of March 29 though, he still wrote to his brother Joseph that “War seems almost inevitable.”[ix]  Vienna had determined “almost” to be an unnecessary qualification.  King Joseph and certainly the Emperor were astute enough to know that, but he was also tactfully confirming to the King of Spain, should he prove capable of remaining in that position, that he would not be shortly returning.   On April 12, a courier arrived from Berthier, and Napoleon announced, “They have crossed the (river) Inn.  It is war.”[x]

And war it would be.  Archduke Charles, who would command the primary Austrian offensive army, was no amateur, but a hardened, talented, and experienced leader.  Unfortunately for him, the Aulic Council was not advisory, but supplemented Emperor Francis as the final authority on the Austrian armies’ strategy.  That would be a factor delaying the Austrian onslaught.  Count Johann von Stadion-Warthausen, the Austrian Foreign Minister was, “a man of outstanding gifts, perhaps the foremost diplomat in imperial Austrian history.”^[xi]  That level of talent was necessary to drag out negotiations with the French, who would not be misled about Austrian intentions much longer.  At this point, it would appear that both sides were delaying, though for very different reasons.  Napoleon had to scrape together an army, while borrowing from his Spanish forces, and threatening recalcitrant allies to provide the additional manpower, without which he could not hope to match the Austrians, whose attention was entirely focused on beating Napoleon.  This Charles proposed to do by a lightening attack against Davout in Saxony with overwhelming force.  That attack was designed to encourage revolt against the French Confederation.  A second Austrian army would enter the Tyrol from Italy to encourage those hardy mountaineers into revolt.  Before the offensive though, Charles wanted to finalize his preparations.  That reportedly cost the month of January, and the final decision would wait until February.[xii]

Meanwhile, Charles changed his strategy.  He would assemble the main army in Bohemia and attack, with General Hiller protecting the line of the River Inn to the south.  Napoleon’s initial counter moves south of the Danube could directly threaten Vienna, forcing a second change of strategy.  The main army would advance south of the Danube, protecting the route to the capital and possibly threatening Munich.  It was a sound strategy, but the execution was slow and Napoleon’s response would force battle far earlier than the Archduke anticipated.  Napoleon’s hodge-podge army necessarily limited the number of French troops available; however, Davout’s III corps was ready for action and it was probably the finest corps in the French army.  Events were to bear out this assumption.

There was far more intrigue afoot than in Vienna alone.  The Erfurt Convention the year prior had been ratified to stabilize relations between France and Russia, as well as satellite countries. That Convention and the resulting Treaty was to remain secret for 10 years but was already unraveling.  Russia had agreed to back France in the event of war with Austria, but Tsar Alexander’s commitment would not be matched by his actions.  Napoleon, who was nothing if not perspicacious, would take that possibility into account. 

The Sublime Porte in Turkey was also supposedly allied with the French, but revolution had made the situation there one of chaos.  Russia moreover, still had designs on partitioning Turkey.  Russia’s dream was to take control of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, a situation which Napoleon would never allow.   Should Britain and Russia become allies again – and Napoleon had little doubt they would at the first propitious moment – British ships could not be allowed through the straits.[xiii]

 Also, Russia did not feel limited by her occupation of the border states of Wallachia and Moldavia.  Finland would be the next Russian target, and possibly Poland thereafter.  Critics of Napoleon claim that Napoleon was primarily responsible for the clash between the Russian and French Empires in 1812.  They are wrong.  At the very conference of Erfurt itself, the Tsar wrote to his mother:

   “What other means has Russia of maintaining the alliance (unavoidable and necessary for me) with the dreadful Colossus than by falling in with his ideas for the time being and showing him that he can prosecute his plans without distrust?  All our efforts must be directed towards obtaining a free breathing time and working, in the greatest secrecy, to increase our forces.” [xiv]

The belief in St. Petersburg of course, was that Napoleon’s ambition was not by any means limited to the conquest of Spain.  There was no doubt in the minds of the courtiers that Austria, and subsequently Russia would follow.  The Tsar’s personal fondness for Napoleon had long dissipated.  That is not to mention the hatred of the court for the Emperor.  The unwillingness of the Tsar – and more particularly his merchant subjects – to observe the blockade against English goods, made long term amity tenuous at best.  Napoleon was not only cognizant of the situation, but he himself had had difficulty enforcing the continental blockade in France and Holland, where brother Louis had become more Dutch than the Dutch.    

Nevertheless, it was critical to keep Russia at least neutral; if she engaged against Austria per the Tsar’s commitment, so much the better.  During February, the Emperor formally announced to Russia (but well before Austria’s declaration of war) that negotiations had broken down with Austria.  This he did publicly because the treaty terms with Russia required that Russia would only fight with France if Austria was the aggressor.  In the event, that was true enough, as Emperor Francis and his warlords had no intention of moving slowly while the French were dealing with their Spanish ulcer.  Unbeknownst to Napoleon, though English gold would back Austria, it was contingent upon the Austrians taking the field. [xv]

To further complicate the situation, the independence-minded Tyrolese had rebelled against their Bavarian overlords, and the arrival of Austrian troops was greeted with enthusiasm, with the Austrians in an unaccustomed role as liberators.  In Italy, Archduke John (brother of Charles) had given a drubbing to Prince Eugene, Napoleon’s area commander, driving him back to the Adige.  In the northern sector, Archduke Ferdinand would occupy Warsaw on April 20.

The main area of operations would be in the border areas of Bavaria, though Napoleon hoped to move faster than the notoriously ponderous Austrian high command.  The only way he could stabilize his position in Europe was to effect a swift victory against the Austrians; if that campaign became drawn out; or worse, another ulcer, the French outlook would be very grim.  There were also serious rumors of a pending English invasion in Belgium or Normandy.

The question therefore, was how to assemble a large enough army to defeat Austria, keep Prussia at bay, energize the reluctant Russians, hold Bavaria and his other allies close, and prevent any further British invasions – all this while maintaining the initiative and the caliber of units in Spain.  The task was maddeningly difficult.

Napoleon acted with his customary vitesse.  While stabilizing the political situation in Paris, the Emperor drafted conscripts two years in advance, created a new “Corps of Observation of the Army of the Rhine” as well as a new reserve corps, and merged allied contingents to a new Grand Army of Germany.  It numbered around 174,000.[xvi]  Additionally, Saxons, Poles, and the Army of Italy added an additional 102,000.  In total, Napoleon would command about 275,000 troops, of which 29,000 were cavalry.

His strategy would entail placing blocking forces in the north – Poniatowski’s 18,000 Poles and Bernadotte’s 16,000 strong Saxon command; and in the south, where Eugene’s 68,000 Army of Italy, and Marmont’s 10,500 in Dalmatia would be expected to hold off an expected major Austrian advance.  Napoleon himself would concentrate on the Danube and hence to Vienna.   He anticipated the main Austrian advance to come north of the Danube.  That conclusion would prove to be mistaken.

The corps of Davout (65,000), Oudinot (20,000) and Massena (40,000) headed for the upper Danube, with Lefebvre’s Bavarians (30,000) as an advance “early warning” force.[xvii]  The Emperor considered his options.  Given the forces available to Austria, and the possibility of their attacking toward Dresden (where Bernadotte’s limited forces would be expected to block them, while Napoleon attempted to cut their line of communications), he decided that Ratisbon (also spelled Ratisbonne and known as Regensburg by the locals in Bavaria) was the wisest choice.  That city is strategically dominant along the Danube.  It would also permit him to attack the Austrians in the rear should they attempt a maneuver toward Nuremberg to the northwest.  This however, depended upon the Austrians moving no earlier than April 15th.

The Viennese high command – the Aulic Council – and Archduke Charles thought otherwise.  The Austrians limited their advance into Italy (and hence to the Tyrol to encourage revolt) to two corps plus larger Landwehr units, a total of 60,000 under Archduke Johann. 20,000 under Archduke Ferdinand would be raised in Galicia to guard Austria’s Polish possessions and block any move by Poniatowski.

There would be two main armies against Napoleon.  Two corps in Bohemia (Bellegarde’s I Corps with 38,000 and Kollowrath 2^nd Corps with 20,000) would take Ratisbon from the north side of the Danube.  The larger force of six corps under Archduke Charles himself would advance on the south side. This main army group totaled 220,000 men, with an additional 20,000 under Archduke Maximilian holding Vienna.  In total, the Austrian forces totaled 320,000 plus Landwehr militia of an estimated 200,000.[xviii]  Both sides badly miscalculated.

Napoleon was still in Paris on the 12^th of April when he received the first frantic communications from Berthier.  At seven p.m. Napoleon was at the Elyseé with Cambaceres when a message was handed to him.  His comment was curt.

  “They have crossed the (river) Inn; it’s war.”[xix]

First Act

He asked to be awakened at 2 a.m. and by 4 a.m. on the 13^th, he was en-route to Bavaria by coach.  He would arrive just in time to prevent what could have been a catastrophe.  The major French units had been separated too far in advance due to the errant delivery of, and misunderstanding of, the orders from Napoleon to Berthier.  Napoleon’s order on March 28^th had been as follows:

   “Should the Austrians attack before April 10^th, the army shall be collected behind the Lech, the right occupying Augsburg, the left resting on the right bank of the Danube at Donauworth.”[xx]

In other words, in the event of an attack earlier than expected, the French were to be within 35 miles (less than two days march) of each other, and out of reach of the Austrian advance, pending the Emperor’s arrival.  The Austrians however, had crossed the River Inn (marking the border of Bavaria) the day following their declaration of hostility on April 9^th.   Lefebvre’s three Bavarian divisions alone opposed them, isolated from the other French corps.

Berthier was sent two messages, the first by visual telegraph on the 10^th, the very day the Austrians began to march.  That order instructed him as follows:

   “I think the Emperor of Austria will attack shortly.  Proceed to Augsburg, in order to act in conformity with my instructions, and if the enemy has attacked before the 15^th, you must concentrate all the troops on Augsburg and Donauworth, let everything be ready to march.”[xxi]

Augsburg and Donauworth were considerably west of Ratisbon, i.e. farther away from the now-expected route of the Austrian advance. That message however, was delayed by fog and bungling until it finally arrived on the 16th.  A second message sent by horseback one hour after the first (and therefore intended to arrive days after the first missive) arrived on the 13^th.  It read as follows:

   “The Duke of Auerstadt (Davout) will set up his headquarters at Ratisbon; his army will place itself within a day’s march of that town, and this move will take place whatever happens.”[xxii]

Strategically, Ratisbon was by far the strongest position – if the French could take it with their primary forces.  Not having received the earlier message, Berthier followed what he believed to be a precise order from Napoleon, and instructed Davout to move forward to Ratisbon.  Davout, who was north of the Danube, had been initially ordered toward Ratisbon by Berthier, had fallen back on his own initiative towards the rest of the French forces, and then been ordered back to Ratisbon – – all based on the faulty communication of the orders Berthier had received from the Emperor.  Oudinot and Lefebvre had received the same instructions to move forward (though yet another order from Napoleon had called Oudinot’s corps back), while Massena was at Augsburg, about 80 miles away to the southwest.  This left the French in a dangerous position, and Berthier at his wit’s end.  Specifically, both Lefebvre on the right bank of the Danube and Davout on the left were now extended in isolation.  They were far ahead of where Napoleon had expected they would be given the early Austrian advance, viz. the backup staging ground of Augsburg and Donauworth.  They were also completely separated from each other.

All the accounts that I’ve read by the way, agree on only one thing, that Berthier was incompetent, and totally out of his depth during this period.  I strongly demur; the fault was not his, he obeyed the orders he received to the letter.  Napoleon left Paris several days later than he should have, and meanwhile, issued very explicit, numerous, and – in the order as received – bewilderingly contradictory instructions.  Such is the nature of warfare, then and now.

Levebvre’s Bavarians had already been in action on the 16^th and were pushed back by the Austrian advance guard near Landshut, a town about 40 miles south of Ratisbon.   

Berthier, at midnight on the 16^th:

   “In this position of affairs, I greatly desire the arrival of your Majesty, in order to avoid the orders and countermands which circumstances as well as the directives and instructions of your Majesty necessarily entail.”[xxiii]

A masterpiece of tact, not a “pass the buck” attempt, as the British historian Dr. Chandler (for example[xxiv]) claimed.  Berthier obviously understood the danger, and the Chief of Staff’s job was to implement explicit instructions from the Commander-in-Chief.  He did not have the authority to countermand them.  Had he taken the initiative to overrule his master’s direct orders, he faced Napoleon’s wrath, if not a court martial.[xxv] 

Napoleon certainly understood the problem of rear echelon micromanagement.  General Bonaparte had been apoplectic with his political masters micro-managing his Italian campaigns many years before.  Fortunately, Napoleon arrived on the 17^th.   Astonishingly, he moved so fast that early on the 17^th , he re-routed briefly to Ludwigsburg, responding to a hysterical letter from the king of Wuttermberg, yet still arrived at Donauworth the same day!  The Guard had been left far behind; Napoleon arrived at the staging ground accompanied by Wurttemberg cavalry. [xxvi]  The Guard would not catch up for another week.

As for the Austrians, Archduke Charles was now at Landshut, having driven Lefebvre’s Bavarians back.  If one consults a map, the distance required for the Austrian army to engage was far shorter than that of the French.  The Aulic Council however, had vacillated for weeks, when time favored the Austrians. As a result, they missed the chance to attack the French corps as they arrived piecemeal. Still, the Austrians moved quicker than anticipated by Napoleon.

As of the 17^th then, the obvious route for the Austrians was to cross the Danube west of Davout, which would lead to the Iron Marshal’s corp’s annihilation.  Davout would be driven to the river’s bank by the Bohemian corps pushing south, and Charles advancing northwest. Unfortunately, for the Austrians, Davout had already crossed the Danube, excepting Friant’s division, which headed west leading the Bohemians on a wild goose chase. 

The Archduke would leave Feldmarschall-Leutenant Hiller’s corps (Vth, VI, and VII Reserve Corps) moving due west from Landshut, to protect his left flank.  The crossing would be useless, and Hiller would be left vulnerable.  So, Charles determined to drive directly forward, hoping to wedge himself between Lefebvre and Davout.  The direct route was through swamps, and he wasn’t sure of the exact positions of the French.  So, he separated his forces into three columns driving northwest, intending to destroy both Lefebvre and Davout.  Hiller’s corps would advance directly west still protecting the Austrian left flank.  The Archduke had amassed 66,000 men at Rohr, 35,000 at Ludmannsdorf to protect the flank, and 25,000 reserves at Moosburg.

These plans made perfect sense assuming that Napoleon’s plan was to try to advance his other corps to join Davout and Lefebvre in the area between Ratisbon and Landshut.  After all, Napoleon was legendarily fond of moving forward to the attack.  If the plan succeeded, Massena, Oudinot, Vandamme’s Wurttembergers, and the heavy cavalry would arrive to mourn at the scene of Davout’s and Lefebvre’s destruction.  Unfortunately for Archduke Karl, Napoleon quickly surveyed the maps, and devised an entirely different and positively brilliant plan. 

Closing the Fist

Given the reality of his dispositions, concentrating his forces could be done with relative ease if they met halfway between the corps at Augsburg, and those of Davout and Lefebvre extended to the front.  Ratisbon would have of course, to be abandoned.  Napoleon needed to buy some time and ordered Lefebvre to attack the Austrian left at 4:00 a.m. on the 18th.  On the night of the 18^th, the Iron Marshal began marching his corps southwesterly toward Geisenfeld.   He had not received the order to have Friant’s division stay on the left bank.   A small garrison of 2,000 was left to hold Ratisbon and its key bridge over the Danube under Colonel Coutard.  That worthy would shortly be faced by 23,000 Austrians under Kollowrath.

Davout was now confronted with 80,000 Austrians, only realized by Napoleon late that night.  Something would have to be done, and quickly. The Emperor repeatedly exhorted Massena to move rapidly with Oudinot to Pfaffenhoffen.  Together, their corps numbered 57,000.  Massena was given license to either turn left to join Davout if necessity dictated, or right toward Landshut should he be in a position to attack Charles’s flank or rear.  Massena’s advance would presumably pull part of the Austrian corps westward to meet the possible flanking attempt.  Vandamme’s 13,000 Wurttembergers would advance to Ingolstadt to hook up with Davout and Lefebvre.[xxvii] 

On the 19^th, Lefebvre was ordered to go back on the defensive.  He and his Bavarians had withdrawn under pressure from Hiller to the town of Abensberg.  The Archduke and Marshal Davout’s forces approached each other until 11:00 a.m., when the French vanguard and the Austrian left clashed.  After stout resistance, the Austrians were driven back, suffering heavy losses.  An attempt by a large Austrian force to outflank Davout was in fact met by Lefebvre’s corps and defeated.  The three lines dictated by the Archduke had failed in their task of meeting Davout’s main corps with overwhelming superiority.  On the other hand, the brunt of Charles’ main force was not yet in action.

By 1:00 p.m. the Emperor knew that Davout was engaged.  He therefore ordered Vandamme forward in support, and Massena to redirect one of Oudinot’s divisions northward to Neustadt.  As dusk began, Massena’s forced march with the rest of his forces had reached Pfaffenhoffen.

Given the fog of war, Napoleon could only speculate as to how the battle had progressed.  With no news from Lefebvre and Davout coming in, he was becoming gravely concerned, and about midnight, he ordered Massena to redirect the rest of Oudinot’s corps in support of the two marshals he knew were in action.[xxviii] He anxiously sent out queries, including one to Lefebvre at 3:00 a.m. demanding reports, which eventually trickled in.  The French center was secure and both marshals had been victorious at the battle of Thann, as it is known to the French.

What had happened to the Austrian plan?  The main attack force under the Archduke in three columns suffered from poor intelligence; as a result, only one of the three had engaged the French, and were summarily repulsed with heavy casualties.  Astoundingly, three French divisions had triumphed over the main Austrian forces, or so it appeared. That force was now entirely separated from Hiller’s and Klenmayer’s corps on the left, which managed to march west by northwester without event. 

Nearly as ominously for the Austrians, the legendary Marshal Lannes had now arrived from Spain, and was given command of a makeshift corps consisting of two divisions plus two cuirassier divisions.  This new corps would form the left for the coming advance.

As of April 20^th, the array of forces was as follows:  The Austrian left was comprised by Hiller and Klenmayer’s corps, isolated from the main army, and forming what amounted to a left flank force.  The main force was still in the center under Archduke Louis and Hohenzollern, with a large portion unengaged on the right flank.

The French plan of attack was based on the mistaken impression that the Austrian army had been severely mauled on the 19^th.  In fact, the reports from Davout and Lefebvre overestimated the size of the forces they had encountered.

The Breakout

Napoleon’s main battle group would drive through the center of the weakened Austrian main battle line, and then spread out toward the right to envelope Hiller and to the left to finish off the supposedly vastly weakened Austrian right. In the drive forward they would be successful at Abensberg, but the Austrian right was far stronger than supposed by the French.  

The French extreme left was held by Davout, down to two divisions, and instructed to hold his position.  Lannes had two divisions (Morand and Gudin), supplemented by cuirassiers units under Nansouty and St. Sulpice.  This comprised the French left for this operation.

Lefebvre was placed in command of Vandamme’s Wurttemburgers, adding to his own three Bavarian divisions to comprise the middle.  Oudinot held the right operational flank with two divisions.  The French attacked and crashed through Archduke Louis’ corps near Abensburg.  Oudinot would drive his wedge toward Hiller, on whom he would inflict a sharp reverse, joining with Massena to drive a wedge between Hiller and Klenmayer’s corps and the rest of the Austrian main force.

Meanwhile, Massena was driving on the very extreme right toward Landshut, expected to stop Hiller from retiring over the Isar River.  In this endeavor the French would fail, despite forced marches by the intrepid Massena.  By evening on the 20^th, Hiller’s forces had retreated successfully to Landshut, and left a garrison blocking the bridges over the Isar.  Still, it would appear on the 21^st as primarily a mopping-up operation for the French.

Davout was now to move back to Ratisbon with only two divisions.  These were expected to be enough to finish off the Austrian III corps “remnants” and then attack the two Bohemian Austrian corps north of the Danube.  The main French advance would be southeast toward Landshut, with the objective of driving straight forward to Vienna.  Lannes’ newly formed  Corps, the Württemberg units, a division from VII Corps and two cuirassier divisions (App. 51,000 men) were to accomplish what was presumed to be the main Austrian army. Unfortunately, nearly three Austrian corps stood facing Davout, who was supported by Lefebvre’s remaining units. 

On the 21^st Napoleon himself led the attack on what he believed to be the main Austrian force.  Vandamme’s corps attacked first, reached the Isar and engaging in a fierce cavalry battle with Hiller’s cavalry.  The French then attacked at the two bridges crossing the river with Lanne’s corps behind Vandamme’s.  The Austrians fought briefly, then retreated across the eastern Spitalbrücke bridge, setting it on fire.[xxix]  The French under General Mouton successfully crossed the flaming bridge and moved into Landshut.  Meanwhile, Massena’s IV corps had crossed the Isar at Moosburg (south of Landshut). The Austrians continued to retreat, having lost 8-10,000 casualties, 600 caissons and 7,000 other vehicles.  Their remaining force in the sector however, was still intact and in good order. Bessiere’s cavalry and a contingent of infantry were left to pursue Hiller.

Alarmingly, prisoner interrogations began to recount that Napoleon’s victory at Landshut was secondary to the main Austrian forces.  Those were to the north facing Davout.  Even more ominously, Ratisbon’s 2,000 French defenders had been forced to surrender to the 23,000 Austrians on the afternoon of the 20th.  This gave unfettered access for the Austrians to bring in the two northern corps over the Ratisbon Bridge to supplement the main battle force facing Davout and Lefebvre.  Alternatively, Charles could withdraw his main force north across the bridge, though that would leave the road to Vienna unguarded.  One of those divisions had already arrived.  The largely unbloodied main force on the south side of the Danube had unquestioned numerical superiority, and the Archduke therefore determined to attack.

Davout was in a very perilous situation, for the brunt of the Austrian army would attack with a nearly 3 to 1 superiority.   Furthermore, over half of Davout’s III corps had been detached to Lanne’s striking force, and Lefebvre’s VIIth was depleted as well.  Dr. Chandler’s quotes from Davout to Napoleon on the 21^st explain the situation perfectly, and bear repeating:

11:00 a.m. sent by Davout, received by the Emperor late in the evening of the 21st: “Sire – the whole enemy army is before me.  The fighting is very hot.”  Lefebvre confirmed the report independently.

5:00 p.m. sent by Davout, received by the Emperor later that night.  The Austrians were attacking Davout’s left flank.  “I will hold my positions – I hope.”[xxx]

The Emperor had assumed that given the French breakthrough that the Archduke’s most likely decision would be to retire eastward toward Straubing, or southeast toward Landau.  He had no idea that the Austrian army was both intact and numerous, that the Ratisbon Bridge had been taken, and that his adversary had maneuvered the Austrian army to a strong position near Eckmühl.  Nevertheless, neither Lefebvre nor the Iron Marshal were men given to exaggeration.  

Napoleon still believed that the Austrians would fall back, but he decided to reinforce his left flank with two divisions from Oudinot, and a Bavarian division.  That left 36,000 French facing 75,000 Austrians in the area of Eckmühl.  Napoleon had expected Lannes to turn the Austrian flank, forcing the latter’s retreat.  He was however, shortly dis-advised of that reasoning.

7:00 p.m. General Piré sent personally to Napoleon’s headquarters, now at Landshut.  He arrived early in the morning of the 22^nd and reported that Davout was running low on ammunition and the Austrians were still attacking.  Napoleon therefore ordered Vandamme on yet another forced march, this time north toward Ergeltsbach, midway between Landshut and Eckmühl.  Vandamme’s 25,000 troops were to meet Davout’s right flank and then continue toward Straubing.  Meanwhile, Napoleon would move the rest of his army east toward Passau (about 45 miles east) enroute to Vienna.  That would certainly dislodge Charles, or so he thought.   Fortune yet again smiled on Napoleon as he was issuing orders to that effect.  Davout’s latest missive reported no Austrian withdrawal; St. Sulplice reported that his hussars had seen no movement toward either Straubing or Landau.

Napoleon reversed his tactics instantly, writing to Davout, “I am resolved to get on the move, and I will be near Eckmühl by midday and in a position to attack the enemy vigorously by three o’clock.  I shall have 40,000 men with me.  Send me aides-de-camp with Bavarian escorts to let me know what you have done during the morning….Before midday I shall be in person at Ergeltsbach.  If I hear a cannonade, I shall know that I must attack.  If I do not hear one, and you are in an attacking position, have a salvo of ten guns fired once at midday, the same at one o’clock, and again at two.  My aide-de-camp, Lebrun will be on his way to you by a quarter past four; I have decided to exterminate Prince Charles’ army today, or tomorrow at the very latest.”[xxxi]

Napoleon had momentarily forgotten the millennia old military maxim that the enemy gets to have a say in such matters.   But act he did.  Leaving Bessieres with two divisions plus some cavalry to chase Hiller, Napoleon’s main battle force left on a forced march at 3 a.m.  They would arrive at the Eckmühl environs around 1 p.m.

Meanwhile, Charles had positioned his IIIrd and IVth corps east-west from Abbach on the Danube to Eckmühl.  This had the additional advantage of protecting his line of communications with the two northern corps of Bellegarde and Kollowrath as Ratisbon was just north of the IIIrd and IVth.   Hohenzollern’s III Corps (16,000) and Rosenberg’s IV Corps (21,000) were to pin Davout’s left flank.  Kollowrath’s fresh 28,000 (who had moved over the Danube to join the main army) and Lichtenstein’s reserve would turn Davout’s left flank, and continue on to Abbach along the river.  Austrian superiority would allow this maneuver.

The Austrian attack however, ran into stiff opposition from the French cavalry in wooded terrain, slowing their impetus.  Archduke Charles’s skirmishers quickly confirmed that Davout’s badly weakened corps was not retreating; nor was that of Lefebvre. Given the odds the French faced, that could mean only one thing – Napoleon’s main force would be arriving soon. Time was of the essence to achieve an Austrian victory, but it was too late. Napoleon, Lannes and Vandamme had arrived with reinforcements.   Seeing this, Davout not only failed to withdraw, he counter-attacked to pin the Austrians, while Lanne’s corps and Vandamme’s Wurttembergers attacked Rosenberg’s IV corps, capturing the Eckmühl bridge and beginning to turn the Austrian flank.  This left the valiant Archduke no choice; the Austrians began an orderly withdrawal to Ratisbon.

The French infantry were exhausted by constant fighting and marching, and bivouacked on the battlefield.  74 squadrons of cavalry would harass the Austrians throughout the night.  Davout’s and Lefebvre’s corps’ defense of the sector at Eckmühl on the 21^st and 22^nd would prove to be one of the most astounding French victories of the entire Empire period. 

The Curtain Falls…or does it?

During the early hours of the 23^rd, the Austrians began their somber retreat at Ratisbon, filing over the main bridge but leaving a rear-guard of 6,000 to hold the fortifications.  At dawn, the French followed, but were stopped cold at the battlements and ditch protecting it.  This might have been a major setback; Ratisbon had to be taken. 

After two failed attempts, the legendary Lannes grabbed a scaling ladder and shamed his officers and men into a successful conquest of the fort, but not yet the bridge over the Danube.  Napoleon was slightly wounded in the foot by a spent cannonball, and Massena’s attempt to cross the Danube at Straubing was forestalled by the destructions of the bridges there.  The town of Ratisbon itself was taken at 3 p.m. [xxxii]The Archduke’s retreat had been entirely successful, and his army was still formidable.

The Austrians were now in Bohemia heading north, and rather than chase them, Napoleon determined to advance on the capital.  His successes so far would keep his Confederation of the Rhine allies on the French side, and a thrust to Vienna would lessen the pressure on Eugene’s army in Italy.  Another great test would await him at Aspern-Essling, followed by the final reckoning at Wagram.

Some personal observations….

Historians’ accounts of campaigns and battles often share the common thread of, “He should have done this, he erred in that”, sometimes endlessly; often inaccurately.  Hindsight has clarity that battlefields lack.  In this campaign at least, two talented commanders played a lethal and lengthy game of chess.  Several hours would elapse between each major reportable event, and that reporting would need to be sifted and compared against all the other information vacuumed into the headquarters of the commanders.  

Then again, too often, talented commanders sometimes become incompetent in the retelling; such a one was Archduke Charles.  The Archduke was up against perhaps the best commander ever.  He led an army that had repeatedly suffered defeat against the French.  On the plus side admittedly, the Austrian army was far better than that which had faced the French before. The strategy – even with two major changes – was sound enough. But in warfare, execution is everything.

The tardiness of the advance – both its timing and pace, for both of which he was partially responsible – completely negated the Austrians’ initial advantage.  Still, having three separate spearheads, each outnumbering the vulnerable corps of Davout, each advancing parallel to the others, was certainly sound tactically.  They were close enough, at least on paper, to join in enveloping Davout’s corps, and possibly Lefebvre’s as well, in the event of a battle.  Napoleon had used the same tactics in other engagements, and certainly believed in its soundness, as he later observed:   

   Since Great armies cannot march in single column without running the risk of having the head of the column defeated by the enemy, before the rear, which is often a day’s march behind, can come to its aid, it is necessary to form them into several marching columns. [xxxiii]

Bad luck then struck the Austrians.  Only one of those three advances contacted Davout obliquely – and rough terrain again slowed the rate of advance.  Then an almost incredibly defense by Davout’s corps, Lefebvre’s Bavarians and a couple of French divisions in the VIIth, blunted the attack.  When the Archduke concluded that the game was up, and French supremacy on the battlefield – at least for the time being – became obvious, Charles’ retreat was admirable.  He pulled his legions north of the Danube in a first class fighting withdrawal. They would soon be fit to fight again.

Napoleon’s brilliance and astounding tactical ability need no introduction, but those characteristics were never more rapid, never more incisive, than they would be during these preliminary battles.  Perhaps surprising to those who viewed (and view) Napoleon as largely an offensive commander, his first moves upon reaching Berthier’s HQ was to pull back Davout and Lefebvre.  If one consider the corps of his army as fingers, he closed them into a tight and nearly impregnable defensive fist.  Had he tried to move the rest of his corps forward, Davout’s III and Lefebvre’s VII corps would almost certainly have been destroyed; as it was, it was a close call.  From that position of strength, the “fist” lashed out, and finally forced Charle’s retreat.

The French victory was far from pre-ordained.  It’s instructive to recall that 1) the Guard was still enroute and took no part in these battles;  2) much of Napoleon’s army wasn’t French;  3) his forces were assembled helter-skelter because of a fast approaching emergency, and had no experience working together;  4) the French were outnumbered;  5) Napoleon didn’t arrive until the forces were already engaged, after a lightening journey all the way from Paris; 6) the French  line of communications was far longer than that of the Austrians and 7) the French had been concentrating most of their resources in Spain.  Napoleon’s success in this first stage of the campaign is almost incredible.  After all, he was facing a unified army fighting close to home.

 During the campaign, limited information, much of it erroneous, had been dribbling in, continually negating Napoleon’s own understanding of the situation.  That was based on reports from his commanders; theirs in turn, on those of hussar scouting probes, Austrian deserters and prisoners, and the reports of junior officers. There is no doubt that based on the reports he had received about the strength and location of Charles’ main force on the 21st, Napoleon presumed the Austrians would be retreating either over the Danube or (more likely) along that river to block Vienna. 

Interestingly, he rather cautiously reinforced Davout until he was certain of the situation.  This he did to keep open the option of hitting the supposedly retreating Austrians in their flank. When the reality became certain by the arrival of General Piré and Davout’s final report early a.m. on the 22nd, he changed his plan.  He then acted instantly – at 2 a.m.  

Few commanders would have personally led an eleven hour forced march in pitched darkness, having just reversed their own prior convictions based on new information.  That ability was based on his own incredible self-confidence. 

Which leads us to two points; the first concerning morale. The Austrians were admittedly fighting on ground about 180 miles from Vienna, but theirs was an offensive operation.  It was only after the Five Days Campaign that sacred Austrian ground would become the battle arena.  The French, on the other hand, had the distinct advantage of having repeatedly humiliated Austria, most notably at Austerlitz.  That confidence was a formidable asset, abetted by that of a man whose presence alone was deemed to be worth 40,000 men.  Napoleon to Eugene during this period, “In war you can see your own troubles; that of the enemy you cannot see.”[xxxiv]

As for the Bavarians, Wurttembergers et al, their commanders wouldn’t dare attempt an anti-French uprising; not so long as the feared Napoleon was considered invincible.  It would take the 1812 Russian debacle to accomplish that.

Secondly, a word of admiration for the French sub-commanders is in order.  There were no warlords in the world with the battle experience brought to the campaign by Napoleon’s senior officers.  Davout was – and is – considered by many to be the very finest of the Marshals.  Lefebvre was a combat commander rather than tactician, but his eventual command of the Old Guard was more than justified by his record, certainly displayed here.  The immortal Lannes was Napoleon’s “fireman” and perhaps his closest friend.  Massena was among the most talented of the Marshals, his well-known vices notwithstanding.[xxxv] 

General St. Hilaire’s incredible defense of his sector led to Napoleon’s battlefield promotion of the general to Marshal on the 22^nd – while the battle still raged!  He and his division was assembled by the Emperor and St. Hilaire was then addressed as follows, “Well, you have earned your marshal’s baton and you shall have it.” [xxxvi]  Regrettably Aspern-Essling would shortly cost him his life, perhaps a fair trade for immortality in the annals of French heroes.  

Another major factor in these (and most) battles was the fog of war.  It is telling to note that it is difficult enough to piece together a coherent course of events from reading historians who have studied the battles.  How far more difficult it must have been to command an army, make sound decisions surrounded by screaming men and horses, barraged with often conflicting information, working on little or no sleep, and with pressure that cannot even be imagined.  This Napoleon did; this did also Herezog Charles.  The difference was the ability of a first-class commander versus that of the foremost genius in the history of warfare.

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